Making sure the child is heared: Part II - representation by Munby, The Honourable Mr Justice
Iarrive at the issue of representation. There are twoseparate questions, both of great importance. The firstis whether the effect of Article 8 is to impose on the
decision-maker – the local authority or the Prison Service,
for example – a duty to permit the parent or child to be
represented. The other is whether there may be
circumstances where the effect of Article 8 is to impose on
the decision-maker a duty to ensure that the parent or
child is represented.
As to the first, although one probably looks in vain in the
books for any plain and unambiguous statement of
principle, I believe the law to be clear. Certainly in the
context of child protection, and in all probability in
analogous situations – I have in mind, for example, the
situation where a mother in prison is facing separation
from her baby – Article 8 requires the decision-maker to
permit both the parent and the child, if they wish, to
appear by some suitable representative. Clear statements of
principle may be lacking but the indications in the cases
are, I think, clear enough (R v Cornwall County Council ex p
LH [2000] 1 FLR 236 at 244C, Re L at paras [151], [154],
Re G at para [45], R (D) v Secretary of State at para [29] and
Claire F v Secretary of State at para [159]).
The second question obviously raises issues of much
greater difficulty. It is one thing to say that the decision-
maker – the local authority or the Prison Service – must
permit a parent or child to bring a representative along; it is
a very different thing to say that the decision-maker is
under a duty to ensure that the parent and child are
represented, for that may have serious public-funding
implications.
The law on this point is still at an early stage in what I
believe will turn out to be a continuing process of
development and elaboration. It is probably too early to
assert unequivocally that there is a duty to ensure
representation, let alone to define or even to describe the
circumstances in which the duty may come into play. But
there are, I think, a number of significant indications, and
taken together they amount to more than mere straws in
the wind.
In the first place there is the Strasbourg jurisprudence.
As long ago as 1979 the Strasbourg Court had to consider
the complaint of an Irish woman who had been unable to
obtain legal aid and had therefore been compelled to
represent herself in the Irish High Court in proceedings for
judicial separation (Airey v Ireland (1979) 2 EHRR 305).
Holding that there had been a breach of Article 6, which
guarantees the right to a fair trial, the Court at para [26]
said that Article 6:
“may sometimes compel the state to provide for the assistance
of a lawyer when such assistance proves indispensable for an
effective access to court … by reason of the complexity of the
procedure or of the case.”
Now Article 6 is not itself relevant to the matters of
administrative decision-making that I am discussing, but
the case is nonetheless of some significance in the present
context, because the Strasbourg Court went on to hold that
there had also been a breach of Article 8. The Court said
that the fact that Irish law entitled spouses in certain
circumstances to petition for a decree of judicial separation
“amounts to recognition of the fact that the protection of
their private or family life may sometimes necessitate their
being relieved from the duty to live together.” It continued
at para [33]:
“Effective respect for private or family life obliges Ireland to
make this means of protection effectively accessible, when
appropriate, to anyone who may wish to have recourse thereto.
However, it was not effectively accessible to the applicant: not
having been put in a position in which she could apply to the
High Court, she was unable to seek recognition in law of her
de facto separation from her husband. She has therefore been
the victim of a violation of Article 8.”
In short, in relation to a dispute relating to private or
family life, Article 8 – at least in the particular
circumstances of that case – imposed on the state the 3
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obligation to provide the assistance of a lawyer. Comments
by the European Commission of Human Rights in a later
case (Munro v United Kingdom (1987) 10 EHRR 516 at p
518) suggest that this obligation may extend generally to
any case that can be described as “an application … which
regulates the legal relationship between two individuals and
may have serious consequences for any children of the
family.” More recently, the Court has held (P, C and S v
United Kingdom (2002) 35 EHRR 1075 at paras [88]–[91],
[99]–[100], [137]–[138]) that there were breaches of
both Article 6 and Article 8 when a parent was compelled
to represent herself during care and subsequent freeing
proceedings. Importantly, it may be noted, the
consequence of this was that although it was only the
parents’ rights under Article 6 that were held to have been
breached, both the parents’ and the child’s rights under
Article 8 were held to have been breached.
There are also indications to be found in our domestic
case-law. Referring to the predicament faced by parents
when a local authority which holds a care order is
proposing to remove their children, who have been placed
with them in accordance with the care plan approved by
the court, I ventured to make these general comments (Re
G at para [59]):
“Parents who find themselves involved in cases such as this are
often themselves vulnerable, sometimes very vulnerable; they
may suffer from physical or mental disabilities or be
educationally, economically or socially disadvantaged. They
are often ill-equipped to cope with those whom they
understandably see as ‘them’. The parents in the present case
are both somewhat limited and largely illiterate. … The
evidence suggests that they had difficulty accepting and
understanding the local authority’s reasons for concern and
that the local authority had difficulty in getting them to
understand the legal basis on which it was intervening. The
local authority, I am sure, did its best. I mention the matter
only to emphasise that Article 8 imposes positive obligations
on a local authority to ensure that parents are properly
involved in the decision-making process. Part of that
obligation … is the obligation to ensure that the local
authority’s decision-making process is properly documented
and that there is proper and timely disclosure to parents of
relevant documents. But in appropriate cases – and given the
parents’ limitations this is such a case – the local authority’s
obligations will go further. Where for whatever reason –
whether physical or mental disability, illiteracy or the fact that
English is not their mother tongue – parents cannot readily
understand the written word, the local authority must take
whatever ameliorative steps are necessary to ensure that the
parents are not for that reason prevented from playing a full
and informed part in the decision-making process.”
I emphasise the last sentence. The implications are clear
– and it might be thought that they extend beyond the
narrow category of parental disability which I there had in
mind.
CHILDREN IN MOTHER AND BABY UNITS
The most recent cases on the point relate to children in
mother and baby units (“MBUs”). I have already
mentioned Maurice Kay J’s comment about the mother’s
rights under Article 8. But he went on to make an
important observation when speaking of the interests of
the child. He said (R (D) v Secretary of State at para [32]) that,
if it was not obvious what the best interests of the child
may be:
“it is incumbent upon the decision-maker to enlist assistance
from appropriately expert sources, including social services.
Even where it is accepted that the best interests of the child
are in remaining with its mother, the sort of questions which
will arise in carrying out the proportionality exercise will often
be answerable only with the benefit of externally provided
expertise.”
I adopted the same approach recently when quashing
the Secretary of State’s decision to separate Lia-Jade from
her mother, Claire. Both complained that the decision-
making process was flawed in such a way as to breach their
rights under Article 8. I rejected the complaint insofar as it
was put forward on behalf of the mother but accepted the
corresponding complaint put forward by the Official
Solicitor on behalf of the baby, Lia-Jade. It is perhaps
worthwhile to explain why I came to that conclusion (Claire
F v Secretary of State at paras [167]–[168]). I said that:
“This was a decision that turned entirely on an assessment
and evaluation of Lia-Jade’s best interests. … The prison
very properly recognised that Lia-Jade needed an independent
voice to represent her interests and, entirely appropriately,
turned to [the local authority] for that purpose. Ms B was the
person charged with that vital function. The importance of her
role, and the significance of the views she expressed during the
course of the meeting … were plainly recognised by the prison
and would have been apparent to all those present at the
meeting. After all … the minutes show that on no fewer than
three occasions it was stated that the purpose of the meeting
was to decide what was in Lia-Jade’s best interests and that
Ms B was present in order to represent Lia-Jade and to
ensure that a decision was made in her best interests. Sadly,
and fatally, that representation proved to be wholly
inadequate.”
I explained why at para [169]. Essentially it was
because:
“Ms B seems to have been woefully unprepared for the task in
hand. On her own admission she first became involved with
Lia-Jade on the very day of the meeting. There is nothing to
suggest that she had seen any relevant papers prior to arriving
at [the prison]. Her knowledge of the case – her knowledge of
Lia-Jade – was confined to what she was able to glean
immediately before and during the course of the meeting …
[I]t was … incumbent on Ms B to familiarise herself with
the detail of the case and to study the relevant papers before
she arrived at the meeting. For whatever reason that never4
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happened. … In consequence Ms B was severely crippled, –
in truth almost wholly disabled – in performing her appointed
task.”
I added at para [172] that the Secretary of State was
fixed with this procedural inadequacy. As I said:
“It is nothing to the point that the Prison Service did its best
to get social services there. It is no answer for the Prison
Service to say that it has no control over [the local authority],
or that any error in the procedure that derives from the local
authority is not its fault. Its failure was not to adjourn the
meeting when the representation was demonstrably so
inadequate. At the end of the day the issue is the integrity of
the decision-making process, not the blame.”
In other words, if his decision to separate mother and
baby was to be Article 8 compliant, the Secretary of State’s
obligation was to ensure that the baby was properly
represented and that the baby’s representation was
adequate to the gravity of the matter in hand.
What I have been considering here is the question of
fairness in the context of administrative rather than judicial
decision-making about children. This, of course, is why the
focus of my analysis has been on Article 8 and not on
Article 6 of the Convention. What is appropriate in the
context of a judicial hearing – what is mandated by Article
6 – may not be necessary in the context of administrative
decision-making: it will not necessarily be mandated by
Article 8. But administrative decision-makers should be
under no illusions. Article 8 imposes procedural safeguards
which impose on administrative decision-makers whose
decisions impinge on private or family life burdens
significantly greater than I suspect many of them really
appreciate. And the burden may extend in some instances
to an obligation not merely to permit representation but
even to ensure that parents – and particularly children – are
properly represented when decisions fundamental to the
children’s welfare are being taken.
Finally, in this context, I draw particular attention to
what I venture to think is an important observation by
Maurice Kay J (R (D) v Secretary of State at para [32]). It
relates to Prison Service decision-making in the context of
proposed separation of a mother and her baby in a MBU,
but its implications, as it seems to me, go much wider than
that:
“It has to be appreciated that the Prison Service is not a
family proceedings court but nor must it be forgotten that, in
a case such as this, it is required to make a decision of equal
importance implicating the welfare of a child.”
In other words, merely because a decision is taken
administratively rather than by a court is not of itself any
reason why a parent or child should not be adequately
represented. If the administrative decision-maker is to
comply with the Convention he must not merely have
regard to the child’s rights under Article 8. He must make
sure that the child’s interests are appropriately
represented. He must ensure that the child’s voice is heard.
So much for the theory. What of the reality?
REPRESENTATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DECISION-MAKING
The first thing that strikes the lawyer is the almost
astonishing contrast between the support and
representation which is typically made available both to the
parent and, separately, to the child when judicial decision-
making is involved and the almost complete lack of such
support and representation which is available when the
decision-making is administrative rather than judicial.
Whilst this may reflect the fact that Article 6 does not apply
to administrative decision-making, it does not necessarily
take appropriate account of the fact that the corresponding
procedural guarantees to be found in Article 8 apply as
much to administrative as to judicial decision-making.
Care proceedings provide the most obvious and one of the
most striking examples. In court the child has the
assistance of both a guardian and a professional advocate.
Once the final care order is made the child loses both,
though decisions subsequently taken by the local authority
can have just as drastic an effect on the child (and on the
parents) as any order made by a judge.
Nor, unhappily, does experience indicate that this is a
merely formal defect in our system. Too frequently for
judicial ease of mind, if the court has occasion to discover
what has been going on since a care order was made, the
picture suddenly revealed is far from what it should be. It
was the parents’ application for contact which in the
Lambeth case in 2000 (Re F, F v Lambeth Borough Council
[2002] 1 FLR 217) revealed the local authority’s
scandalous and shaming dereliction of duty in relation to
two boys who had been “lost in care” for the best part of
nine years. Sometimes parental concerns about what is
happening – or not – prompts applications for the
discharge of the care order. And the High Court receives a
steady trickle of cases where a child is forced to see judicial
assistance in obtaining contact with a sibling, one or other
or both of the children being in care, and where the fact
that contact is not taking place appears on closer
investigation to be merely an example of more pervasive
deficiencies in local authority planning for the child or
children in care. Thus, a short time ago, I had a sibling
contact case which incidentally revealed the local
authority’s practice of sometimes holding “virtual”
reviews, that is, a review that is a purely paper exercise,
where there is no meeting and no consultation documents
are prepared.
Indeed, it was in major part this judicial perception of
unease that led the Court of Appeal to commend the
system of “starred milestones” in care plans which, most
unfortunately as many would think, was then overturned
by the House of Lords (In re S (Minors) (Care Order: 5





Implementation of Care Plan); Re W (Minors) (Care Order:
Adequacy of Care Plan) [2002] UKHL 10, [2002] 2 AC 291,
reversing Re W and B, Re W (Care Plan) [2001] EWCA Civ
757, [2001] 2 FLR 582).
The simple fact is that there are real problems affecting
too many of the children in our care system. Too often
their substantive rights under Article 8 are not respected as
they should be. And too often these problems arise and
continue because the children affected do not have the
support and representation they should have and which, it
might be thought, Article 8 entitles them to have. Nor is
there room for complacency about the children who find
themselves in prison. The facts revealed both in the Howard
League case and in Moses J’s case, as in many searing
reports of inspections of YOIs by Her Majesty’s Chief
Inspectors of Prisons, past and present, are disturbing and
should concern us all.
In relation to children in care the problems are
particularly intractable. The problem, as the House of
Lords has pointed out (In re S (Minors) at paras [63], [82]),
is that where a child is in care there may be no parent able
and willing to become involved in questioning a care
decision made by a local authority. So the Article 8 rights
of a young child may be violated by a local authority
without anyone outside the local authority becoming aware
of the violation. In practice, such a child may not always
have an effective remedy. As Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead
put it: “The law may provide a panoply of remedies. But
this avails nothing if the problem remains hidden.” Lord
Mackay of Clashfern added bleakly at para [113]:
“As a practical matter I do not see how a child who has no
person to raise the matter on his behalf can be protected from
violation of his or her human rights or the rights conferred on
him or her by our domestic law, other than by reliance on an
effective means by which others bring the violation to notice.”
I should like to think that there is more the judges could
be doing to alleviate the problem identified by the House
of Lords. But our room for manoeuvre as care judges is
limited. One thing we can do, and perhaps more rigorously
now than sometimes in the past, is to insist that the care
plans we are invited to approve set out in appropriate detail
just what the local authority’s plan for the child really is.
Too often one is presented with care plans that are as long
on rhetorical platitudes as they are short on specific detail.
We all know that Johnny needs a safe and secure
environment where his emotional, psychological and
educational needs are met. What we need to be told, and
too often are not, is, for example, that Johnny has certain
identified mental health needs, that they are going to be
addressed by Dr X, that the local authority has arranged
that Dr X will be starting a six-month course of therapy
starting on some specified date, and that the funding for
this therapy is in place, having been authorised by the
appropriate officer with decision-making powers. A care
plan which contains clear and specific detail of this sort
minimises the risk of the child drifting in care, for it sets
out a clear programme whose performance can be
monitored and checked.
But the fact is that most of the problems arise in the
context of administrative decision-making, an arena over
which, by definition, the courts have no control, unless,
that is, someone brings an action either for judicial review
or under the Human Rights Act.
How do we tackle the practical problems that arise in
the context of administrative decision-making, whether by
a local authority, the Prison Service or any other public
authority?
It is in fact in the prison context that one can see the
beginnings of at least a partial solution. In the first place,
the Prison Service is subject to centralised planning and
control. This means that it is much easier for the Prison
Service than it is for local authorities generally to plan,
implement and enforce policies and procedures which are
appropriately child-centred and, critically, which recognise
and give effect to the Article 8 rights of the children for
whom the Secretary of State is responsible, whether in
YOIs or MBUs. These policies and procedures are set out
in very detailed Prison Service Orders which, with only
minor exceptions, have rightly received judicial
endorsement and praise and which, importantly, are fully
Convention compliant. That these policies are of a quality
which, if I may say so, deserves recognition and praise, is
in large measure due to the care which has gone into their
formulation, in particular the care that has been taken by
the Prison Service to enlist multi-disciplinary advice from
many outside experts. Local authorities could do worse
than to adopt similar approaches. The contrast between
the two is striking. Prison Service policies and procedures
recognise at every turn the imperative need to comply with
the requirements of the Convention. Too often still – and
it is now more than three years since the Human Rights Act
came into force – one is left with the feeling that local
authority social workers and team managers do not
appreciate the vital impact of the Human Rights Act, and
that in significant measure this is because the right message
is not coming down from the top. Local authorities need to
ensure that they have in place policies and procedures which
recognise and give effect in practical ways to both the
substantive and the procedural rights guaranteed to parents
and children by Article 8.
Another advantage that the Prison Service appears to
have is in the impact of the work of its Inspectorate. I
appreciate that the role of any Inspectorate is limited but
one feature of the Lambeth case was the rather limited
impact that the Social Services Inspectorate seems to have
had in bringing about improvements in a situation that was
as long-standing as it was concerning. That there were
serious problems at Lambeth, and that these problems had
been identified by the Inspectorate, was borne out by the
fact that it was one of eight local authorities which in6
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October 2000 was given assistance in the form of the
Adoption and Performance Task Force set up under the
chairmanship of the Chief Inspector of the Social Services
Inspectorate. But this could have been of little comfort to
the boys who had been lost in care, as I have said, for the
best part of nine years, or to the 274 other children in
Lambeth who in 1999 had been “looked after” for at least
four years, and of whom more than 100 were still awaiting
permanent placements, or to the 70 children, the
responsibility of just one team alone, who had no allocated
social worker, even though many of them were child
protection cases requiring priority. This is a very large topic
but should there not be, as part of a system of inspection
by the Inspectorate or of regulation or monitoring by a
Children’s Commissioner, some form of audit to enable
such cases to be identified, coupled with effective
administrative machinery, external to the local authority,
designed to ensure that such cases, once identified, are
promptly taken in hand.
NEED FOR GREATER INTER-AGENCY
CO-OPERATION
If there is one fundamental lesson that emerges from the
Howard League case and the case about Claire F and her
baby it is that if the interests of children and babies in YOIs
and MBUs are to be properly protected, and if their
interests are to be properly represented, there is a pressing
need for much greater inter-agency co-operation, in
particular much greater involvement by the relevant local
authorities. I make no apology for repeating what I said
very recently (Claire F v Secretary of State at paras
[174]–[177]):
“the local authority within whose area a prison is located has
a responsibility for all the children within the walls of the
prison … those children who are themselves serving sentences,
usually in [YOIs] … and those children … who are in
prison MBUs because their mothers are serving sentences. The
local authority with primary responsibility for such children is
the authority local to the prison …”
Referring to the evidence I had read both in that case
and earlier in the Howard League case I recorded my
uncomfortable impression that the system is not working
as well as it might and that, in consequence, there are
children both in YOIs and also in MBUs who are not
receiving the support from the local authority to which it
might be thought they are entitled. I continued:
“I am aware that active steps are being taken to remedy the
institutional and organisational difficulties that were
highlighted by the Howard League case. That endeavour is to
be applauded. In this, as in so many other areas involving
children, the key to their welfare is to be found in effective
inter-agency and cross-disciplinary co-operation and co-
ordination. The Prison Service and the relevant local
authorities must ‘work together’ to secure the welfare of the
children for whom the Secretary of State is responsible –
whether they are in YOIs or in MBUs.”
I made clear my belief that, if there are deficiencies in
inter-agency working between the Prison Service and local
authorities, the responsibility for that is not, by and large,
to be laid at the door of the Prison Service, adding:
“Both the policies which regulate YOIs and the policies which
regulate MBUs acknowledge the important role of the local
authority. I have the impression – I hope it is wrong, but I
fear it is not – that too often this is not reciprocated by the
local authorities. … But the position is now clear.
Appreciating the undue burden that falls on the comparatively
small number of local authorities involved – there are, after
all, only 18 YOIs and four MBUs – I do nonetheless hope
that in future all the good work being done by the Prison
Service will be reciprocated by the local authorities.”
But at the end of the day, policies and procedures,
however carefully crafted and however carefully
implemented, are not enough. Parents and children need
support and representation just as much when important
decisions are being taken by administrative decision-
makers as when such decisions are being taken by judicial
decision-makers. And it is here that for the foreseeable
future we have to look to the voluntary sector. We can
demand that public authorities put in place appropriate
and Convention-compliant policies and procedures, but
we have to recognise that their practical ability to provide
support and representation may be limited.
It is hard to over-emphasise how vital are the services
provided, for example, by the Children’s Rights Officer of
the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Children, by the Family Rights Group and, not least, by
NYAS. I know, because I have had children pursuing cases
in front of me, enabled to do so only because of the help and
support they have had from the NSPCC and from NYAS. I
am not, of course, the first judge publicly to recognise the
contribution that NYAS can make: the President, Hale LJ
and Wall J have all delivered reported judgments on the
point (Re A (Contact: Separate Representation) [2001] 1 FLR
715 at paras [21], [32], Re M (Intractable Contact Dispute:
Interim Care Order) [2003] EWHC 1024 (Fam), [2003] 2
FLR 636 at para [18], and A v A [2004] EWHC 142 (Fam)
at paras [24], [131]–[133]). The President and Hale LJ, it
may be noted, recognised, as Hale LJ put it (at para [31]),
that “children … need a voice” or, as the President put it
(at para [22]), that “children should be seen and heard in
child cases and [are] not always sufficiently seen and heard
by the use of a court welfare officer’s report”.
What can NYAS and similar organisations do?
Fundamentally, perhaps, their purpose is to empower those
who are otherwise disempowered, specifically, to inform
children and parents about their rights and to promote
their full participation in planning and decision-making
when local and other public authorities are involved. There
are many ways in which they can empower otherwise 7





disempowered and disadvantaged children or parents.
They can educate and seek to influence developments in law
and practice; they can provide information; and they can
provide advice, support, representation and advocacy. Education
of course is vital, and not just for the children or parents
who are the focus of your activities: public authorities also
need to be educated.
How are you to do all this? Websites are invaluable
means of educating and of providing information and
generic advice. And given the ready access to the internet
that so many children enjoy, and the remarkable facility
that even quite young children have for logging onto and
surfing the internet, there is real scope here for getting the
message over in a way that would have been unimaginable
even a few years ago. Confidential telephone advice- and
help-lines are essential as means of providing advice and
support. And what about e-mails? Representation and
advocacy in the context of administrative decision-making
requires skilled and appropriately trained specialists. They
need not be lawyers, but they must have specialist
knowledge of the relevant law and practice. They need to
be people who are in fact, and can be seen to be,
independent of the local or other public authority, but
equally people who can win the trust and confidence of
both ‘sides’.
And what are the areas in which you ought to be
operating? The need is almost unlimited, so many are the
public authorities and so many are the contexts in which
administrative decision-making can affect the lives of our
children and our parents. One obvious area where the
needs are particularly pressing is local authority decision-
making in child protection and child care cases. Another
important area is in relation to children in prisons,
particularly children in YOIs but also perhaps mothers and
their children in MBUs. Another area of concern is where
children themselves have health, mental health or
educational problems, or have parents who have housing or
mental health problems. As every care judge very quickly
discovers, many of the families who pass through the care
system are afflicted by a variety of problems and difficulties
extending far beyond those which alone concern social
services. Often their problems involve other public
authorities or other departments within the local authority,
and all too often there is a striking lack of co-ordination in
planning for the overall needs of the family. NYAS and
similar organisations have a crucial role to play here if the
voice of the child is to be heard.
The task is huge. The challenge is great. I am delighted
to hear of the work that NYAS is doing with children in
YOIs. It is heartening to hear that, after lobbying by NYAS
and others, a decision has been taken to introduce
advocacy services for children in YOIs. This shows what
can be achieved by the voluntary sector. And it illustrates
how co-operation between public authorities and the
voluntary sector can serve fruitfully to further and protect
the rights of our children.
Let me finish with a rather different aspect of listening
to the child, and one that too often, I fear, we forget. There
are children who are old enough to have minds of their
own and who want to talk – sometimes to talk publicly –
about their experiences of the care system or of other parts
of the family justice system (see Re W (Wardship: Discharge:
Publicity) [1995] 2 FLR 466 at p 474, Kelly v British
Broadcasting Corpn [2001] Fam 59 at p 79 and Re Angela
Roddy at paras [48]–[60]). This is not the occasion for any
extended discussion of a topic which is as important as it is
topical, but my own very clear view is that the workings of
the family court system and, perhaps most importantly of
all, the views about the system of the children caught up in
it, are matters of public interest which can and should be
discussed publicly (Re Angela Roddy at para [83]; see further
Kelly v British Broadcasting Corp pp 77, 87, and Harris v Harris,
Attorney-General v Harris [2001] 2 FLR 895 at para [363]).
Many of the issues litigated in the family justice system
require open and public debate in the media. And what
more important voice can there be in such a debate than
that of a teenager who has gone through all that so many
children caught up in the care system have experienced?
There is, I believe, an important public interest in us
making sure that the voices of such children are heard. But
there is also a very important private interest founded in
the Article 8 rights of the child (Re Angela Roddy at para
[35], applying Botta v Italy and Gaskin v United Kingdom
(1990) 12 EHRR 36):
“For, as the Strasbourg jurisprudence recognises, the ability to
lead one’s own personal life as one chooses, the ability to
develop one’s personality, indeed one’s very psychological and
moral integrity, are dependent upon being able to interact
and develop relationships with other human beings and with
the world at large. And central to one’s psychological and
moral integrity, to one’s feelings of self-worth, is the
knowledge of one’s childhood, development and history. So
amongst the rights protected by Article 8, as it seems to me, is
the right, as a human being, to share with others – and, if
one so chooses, with the world at large – one’s own story, the
story of one’s childhood, development and history.”
So I end where, in a sense, I began: with Article 8. It is
fundamental to everything we do as professionals
concerned with children and their families. It is something
we all need to take very seriously, more seriously, perhaps,
than sometimes we do. Unless we do, the voice of the child
will not be heard.
8
Amicus Curiae Issue 53 May/June 2004
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